207: Tea, Drugs, and Jesus - Flying Tigers and Burmese Roads

WEBVTT

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At a meeting in Washington, D .C. in 1943, President

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Franklin Roosevelt asked his commanders in China

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what they thought of Chinese nationalist leader

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Chiang Kai -shek, who, as Generalissimo, was

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officially the commander -in -chief of Allied

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forces in China. He's a vacillating, tricky,

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undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his

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word, replied General Joseph Stilwell, the overall

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American commander in China. But the general

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commanding the U .S. Army Air Forces in China

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told Roosevelt, Sir, I think the Generalissimo

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is one of the two or three greatest military

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and political leaders in the world today. He

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has never broken a commitment or promise to me.

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That general was Claire Chenault. Welcome to

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the United States of Amnesia. We are the podcast

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that reminds us of what we have forgotten. It

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is often said that history repeats itself. Mark

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Twain allegedly said that history doesn't repeat

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itself, but it rhymes. But over time, many topics

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have become clouded by biases and oversimplifications,

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or have become mythologized and now are misunderstood.

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Misunderstanding means learning the wrong lessons

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from history, perhaps, or even learning nothing

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at all. And that can leave us poorly prepared

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for history's next rhyme. In this episode, Mike

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again leads us in our narrative of how America

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continued to fall short of its goals for China

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in World War II during the second half of the

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war. We meet General Claire Chenault of Flying

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Tigers fame, whose ideas for how to fight in

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China contradict those of his bitter rival, General

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Joseph Stilwell, but gain favor with Chiang Kai

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-shek and Madam Chiang, and at least for a while

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with Franklin Roosevelt. Ultimately, the war

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in China ends in frustration for America, and

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we discuss how the historiography of the China

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-Burma -India theater of World War II changes

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over time, but still can obscure a more basic

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American misunderstanding of Chiang, his government,

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his military, and his communist rivals during

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the war. We also review the obstacles that prevented

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the nationalists and the communists from making

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common cause in China. which will lead to a resumption

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of their bitter civil war after World War II

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ends. Now we must introduce another major American

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military figure of the China -Burma -India theater,

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Claire Chenault, known as Old Leatherface. He

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already was in China when Stilwell arrived. He

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had been a United States Army Air Corps officer.

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Now let's take another terminology break here.

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The United States Army Air Service became the

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United States Army Air Corps in 1926, and then

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it became the United States Army Air Forces in

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June 1941. And that's what would go on to become

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the independent U .S. Air Force in 1947, after

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World War II. There are people who will tell

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you that the Air Corps still existed in World

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War II, but it did not. Air Corps in World War

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II just meant everybody who was an aviator in

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the Army, just like you could talk about the

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Tank Corps, was everybody in tanks, or Infantry

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Corps, was everybody in infantry. It was no longer

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an organization at that point. Anyway, Claire

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Chennault. In the Air Corps, he had been a maverick,

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he was insubordinate, he was an outspoken proponent

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of fighter aircraft, even though Army Air Corps

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doctrine emphasized the role of bombers. So he

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got passed over for promotion, and he retired

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in the 1930s from the Army Air Corps. But after

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retiring, Chenault went to China in 1937 as a

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private citizen when Chiang Kai -shek hired him

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on a three -month contract to assess the Chinese

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Air Force, because Chiang Kai -shek wanted to

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have a modern Air Force. Chiang liked Chenault,

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and Chenault wound up staying in China for eight

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years until almost the end of World War II in

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1945. Chenault was actually more positive, you

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know, in terms of his outlook, and he presented

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things to Chiang. So personality -wise, they're

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going to get along a lot better. One other thing,

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and this is probably worth noting, during the

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30s, Madam Chiang Kai -shek was actually in charge

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of the Air Force. And this enabled her to form

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a very tight relationship with Claire Chenault

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in a sense. And to be honest, just given the

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way the dynamics, the power dynamics. She really

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is the only person who can talk to Chang. Everybody

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else is a subordinate. She is the only person

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that can actually... So to have her in your corner,

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as Chenault definitely did, because of this relationship

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that they developed, was a key part of the way

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he was able to influence things. Yeah, Chenault

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maintained very warm relations with Chiang Kai

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-shek throughout. He was the polar opposite of...

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And Madam Chiang Kai -shek. And Madam Chiang

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Kai -shek, yeah. All right, so Chenault is in

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China. In 1941, President Roosevelt supported

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a recruiting effort for volunteer American pilots

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to fly in the Chinese Air Force. And that resulted

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in the creation of something called the American

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Volunteer Group, or AVG, which was a Chinese

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Air Force unit manned and controlled by Americans.

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And in late 1941, it was under Chenault's command.

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The AVG operated the P -40 Warhawk, and that

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was the United States Army's front -line fighter

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in 1941. The United States, under Len Lees, provided

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a large number of these P -40s to the British

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Royal Air Force, which used them in North Africa.

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They used a different name for them. They called

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them Tomahawks. But anyway, the same plane. And

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the noses of aircraft had been painted with shark's

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eyes and teeth as early as World War I. And in

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World War II, some of those British Tomahawks

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were painted in this way. teeth along the bottom

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of the nose, along the air scoop at the bottom,

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and then some eyes looking right forward where

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the machine guns aimed. After seeing this, the

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American Volunteer Group decided to paint their

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P -40s in the same way, and that marking became

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iconic for U .S. aircraft in China during World

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War II. Now, they were painted to look like sharks,

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but the markings prompted the U .S. press to

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call the American Volunteer Group the Flying

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Tigers, because the markings apparently made

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the press think they were tiger's teeth, not

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shark's teeth. And the name Flying Tigers was

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what stuck. So you're just going to have to accept

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the fact that planes painted like sharks were

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called tigers. Anyway, some people also thought

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that markings were supposed to frighten superstitious

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Japanese pilots by making them think they were

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under attack by dragons, which I think is complete

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nonsense. I think we can give the Japanese pilots

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more credit than that. But a number of things

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created a mystique for Chenault. I mentioned

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that Stilwell had a mystique based on his walkout

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from Burma. We talked about that in the last

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episode. The mystique around the Flying Tigers

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was a myth that arose, that the Flying Tigers

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were brave Americans who had fought the Japanese

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for years before Pearl Harbor. But in fact, they

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didn't fly their first mission against the Japanese

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until a week or two after the Pearl Harbor attack.

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It's true that there were American and other

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international pilots flying in the Chinese Air

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Force in the 1930s, but that was not the American

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Volunteer Group. That was not the Flying Tigers.

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The American Volunteer Group only existed for

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a few months. It was incorporated into the U

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.S. Army Air Forces on July 4, 1942, as part

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of something called the China Air Task Force,

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and in March 1943, it became the U .S. Army Air

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Force's 14th Air Force. Under whatever designation,

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it earned the Distinguished Combat Record, and

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this is another aspect of Chenault's mystique.

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At a time when the Allies were losing everywhere

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badly, including in the air, And Chenault's forces,

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the Flying Tigers, were shooting down far more

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Japanese planes than they lost. And this was

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an unusual success at a time amongst so much

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failure. Chenault developed innovative tactics.

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And without going too far down the air tactics

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rabbit hole here, the issue was that the kinds

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of planes the Japanese flew were much more maneuverable

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than the Allied planes. The Allied planes were

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heavier. which made them stronger in terms of

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their structure, but also made them not as good

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in a turning dogfight. They couldn't maneuver

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as well. And so a lot of Allied pilots dogfighting

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with the Japanese got shot down early in the

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war. Chennault said, well, let's not do that.

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Let's use our aircraft, our P -40s, in a way

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that exploits their advantages, which was they

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had a higher dive speed. They could then use

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that dive speed to climb back up, zoom up high

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again. So Chenault had his pilots do just a series

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of firing passes without doing any dogfighting.

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Go in, shoot at the Japanese planes, go past

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them, zoom up, come around again for another

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firing pass. And this was very successful. And

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throughout the existence of the Flying Tigers

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and their successor organizations, you have to

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give Chenault credit that they always did very

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well in air -to -air combat against the Japanese,

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even at a time when no one else did. So it's

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true that he was successful that way. So between

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this mystique of fighting the Japanese when no

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one else did, which was wrong, and having these

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cool markings on their planes which had a catchy

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name, the Flying Tigers, but also because of

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his actual achievements as an Air Force commander,

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Chennault developed quite a mystique, quite a

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following, which still exists today among people

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in the United States. And he is certainly going

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to be much more, agreeable to Chiang Kai -shek

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in terms of his attitude towards things like

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corruption and so forth. He's actually quite

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the hero down in Louisiana. He wasn't actually

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born in Louisiana, but he spent a lot of time

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there. And let's just say he had kind of the...

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swaggering southern rogue to Stilwell's New England

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Puritan, which the swaggering southern rogue

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works a lot better with Chiang Kai -shek and

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his corrupt administration than does someone

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who is perpetually judgmental towards it. Chenault

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came back into the U .S. Army Air Forces when

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the American Volunteer Group was incorporated

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into them. And technically, this made him a subordinate

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of Stilwell's, because Stilwell commanded all

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U .S. forces in China. But late in 1942, a new

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dispute over strategy arose, and this time it

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was between Stilwell and Chenault. They were

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at loggerheads in a typical ground forces versus

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air forces dispute. And those of you who listened

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to our America First... series will remember

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that we talked at some length about Charles Lindbergh

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having an aviator's understanding of the world,

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which wasn't really broad enough to really understand

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things like armies and navies. Well, that kind

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of came into play here as well. So Chenault made

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a claim, and it's an amazing claim, really, when

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you think about it, that air power alone could

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play the decisive role in China and do it more

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cheaply than anything that Stilwell had recommended.

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He actually said that given about 140 or 150

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planes... Consistently. Yeah. He had to always

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have that number. Yeah. And by World War II,

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that sounds like a lot of planes nowadays, I

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guess. But by World War II standards, that's

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not a lot of planes for an entire theater of

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war. Okay. Given about 140 or 150 planes, he

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could defeat the Japanese in China and maybe

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win the war as a whole against the Japanese.

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Now, Stilwell argued that this was nonsense,

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that only a Chinese ground force supplied and

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modeled along U .S. lines could win the war in

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China. And besides, if the Chinese army was not

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reformed, the Japanese could launch a ground

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offensive and capture Chenault's air bases and

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knock his air force out of the war. There's also

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a supply element as well. Well, there's always

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a supply element. Which I've got to say, I don't

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think Chenault took into account as much as Stilwell

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did. Yeah. Well, yeah. Chennault countered Stilwell

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by saying that the Chinese army was perfectly

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capable of defending his air bases. Stilwell

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said a North Burma campaign was necessary to

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get enough supplies into China, but Chennault

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said that the over -the -hump airlift was enough,

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making reopening the Burma road a waste of resources

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and time. And when you think about it, Chennault

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offered a quicker, much less laborious option

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to decision -makers than Stilwell did. And it's

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not going to be costing Cheng and his subordinate

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generals their resources. Yes, we're going to

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come to that. So Stimson and Marshall supported

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Stilwell, as they always did. Unlike Stilwell,

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Chenault had warm relations with Chung Kai -shek

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and Madam Chung. Yes. I mean, just imagine First

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Lady being in charge of the Air Force as well.

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And Chung Kai -shek endorsed Chenault's ideas.

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And why? Because basically, if Chenault was right,

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it meant that Chung's army could sit back and

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watch while Chenault defeated the Japanese. Which

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is what they really wanted to do. What their

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strategy for beating the Japanese was to have

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the other barbarians defeat the Japanese barbarians

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so that they could save up resources for this

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upcoming Armageddon -like civil war. So Chenault's

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ideas were exactly what Chung Kai -shek was really

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looking for. Also supporting Chenault were Joseph

00:13:36.419 --> 00:13:39.240
Alsop. He was an influential journalist serving

00:13:39.240 --> 00:13:42.059
on Chenault's staff who wrote glowingly about

00:13:42.059 --> 00:13:45.700
Chenault. He's also. He was a cousin. What was

00:13:45.700 --> 00:13:48.220
his relationship exactly? He was a cousin of

00:13:48.220 --> 00:13:51.120
Eleanor. Of Eleanor. And he would be a cousin

00:13:51.120 --> 00:13:55.080
of Franklin. But she was the daughter of FDR's

00:13:55.080 --> 00:14:00.120
brother. Okay. And Alsop was the grandson of

00:14:00.120 --> 00:14:04.200
FDR. I'm sorry. She was the daughter of Teddy

00:14:04.200 --> 00:14:09.230
Roosevelt's. brother, Elliot, and Joe Alsop was

00:14:09.230 --> 00:14:15.750
the grandson of one of TR's sisters. So you didn't

00:14:15.750 --> 00:14:17.929
know this was a genealogy podcast, but once in

00:14:17.929 --> 00:14:22.690
a while it is. Yes. Okay. So he's related to

00:14:22.690 --> 00:14:24.590
Roosevelt. He's a distant cousin, at least. He

00:14:24.590 --> 00:14:27.509
was also good friends with Harry Hopkins, who

00:14:27.509 --> 00:14:29.909
was Roosevelt's confidant and advisor. Marshall,

00:14:29.990 --> 00:14:31.509
why don't you tell us what Harry Hopkins' role

00:14:31.509 --> 00:14:34.789
was and position? Well, Harry Hopkins... gets

00:14:34.789 --> 00:14:37.789
introduced into the power dynamic of the New

00:14:37.789 --> 00:14:40.269
Deal actually through Eleanor. And he starts

00:14:40.269 --> 00:14:46.009
out as a social worker who came out of Iowa but

00:14:46.009 --> 00:14:49.029
actually did some work in settlement houses during

00:14:49.029 --> 00:14:51.950
the 20s, and this is where he comes on to Eleanor's

00:14:51.950 --> 00:14:56.830
radar. Gradually, he becomes more and more a

00:14:56.830 --> 00:15:00.289
friend. of FDR's. And in fact, I would say after

00:15:00.289 --> 00:15:03.129
the death of Louis Howe, his longtime advisor

00:15:03.129 --> 00:15:07.950
in 35, Harry Hopkins becomes FDR's best friend.

00:15:08.629 --> 00:15:11.990
FDR is even thinking about making him his successor

00:15:11.990 --> 00:15:16.970
in 1940. And he appoints Hopkins after Hopkins

00:15:16.970 --> 00:15:19.889
has had experience in handling some New Deal

00:15:19.889 --> 00:15:23.210
relief programs. He appoints him Secretary of

00:15:23.210 --> 00:15:28.429
Commerce. Unfortunately, Harry Hopkins suffered

00:15:28.429 --> 00:15:32.409
from stomach cancer and was having difficulty

00:15:32.409 --> 00:15:35.850
staying alive. He had to live on a – assist on

00:15:35.850 --> 00:15:40.850
what was largely a liquid diet. But Hopkins ended

00:15:40.850 --> 00:15:43.549
up moving into the White House as sort of like

00:15:43.549 --> 00:15:46.710
special advisor to the president without – kind

00:15:46.710 --> 00:15:49.629
of like minister without portfolio. And he and

00:15:49.629 --> 00:15:52.830
Roosevelt would see each other all the time.

00:15:52.850 --> 00:15:55.669
They'd have their meals together, et cetera.

00:15:56.279 --> 00:15:59.600
And Hopkins was as close to Roosevelt's alter

00:15:59.600 --> 00:16:03.120
ego as one could get. And at this point, he didn't

00:16:03.120 --> 00:16:04.419
really have an official government position,

00:16:04.559 --> 00:16:06.919
right? No. Harry Hopkins was kind of like a best

00:16:06.919 --> 00:16:08.679
friend of the United States or something. Yeah,

00:16:08.679 --> 00:16:12.740
he basically ran his responsibilities out of

00:16:12.740 --> 00:16:15.240
a back room in the White House on a card table.

00:16:15.399 --> 00:16:19.940
Right. So confident and advisor to Roosevelt.

00:16:19.960 --> 00:16:24.740
Yes. So you had Stimson, Marshall, and Stilwell

00:16:24.740 --> 00:16:28.299
on one side. You had Chiang Kai -shek, Harry

00:16:28.299 --> 00:16:33.179
Hopkins, Joseph Alsop on the other side. And

00:16:33.179 --> 00:16:36.240
Roosevelt says, well, come in and give me presentations

00:16:36.240 --> 00:16:38.419
to advocating, you know, advocating each position.

00:16:38.659 --> 00:16:40.820
So Stilwell and Chenault get called to Washington

00:16:40.820 --> 00:16:43.879
and they give presentations to Roosevelt. Now,

00:16:43.899 --> 00:16:46.639
Stilwell is so uncomfortable giving it that at

00:16:46.639 --> 00:16:48.980
one point FDR asked him if he was ill. Well,

00:16:49.059 --> 00:16:51.600
Chenault actually went first. But Chenault gave

00:16:51.600 --> 00:16:53.799
a polished, well, it went whichever, but Chenault

00:16:53.799 --> 00:16:56.419
gave a polished presentation. And so Chenault

00:16:56.419 --> 00:16:59.519
won the argument because the presentation was

00:16:59.519 --> 00:17:00.940
so much better than Chenault's. Stillwell wasn't

00:17:00.940 --> 00:17:03.799
expecting him to have to compete at that level.

00:17:04.519 --> 00:17:07.319
Plus it was diplomacy intact and he wasn't good

00:17:07.319 --> 00:17:08.640
at those kind of things. He hated to deal with

00:17:08.640 --> 00:17:10.359
politicians and try to explain things to them.

00:17:10.440 --> 00:17:12.299
So there was all that going on in that dynamic.

00:17:12.660 --> 00:17:14.819
At any rate, Chenault's idea carried the day.

00:17:15.819 --> 00:17:18.500
So now this resulted in endless tension over

00:17:18.500 --> 00:17:20.700
supplying Chenault. Because remember that Stillwell

00:17:20.700 --> 00:17:22.900
controlled the supplies and that had not changed.

00:17:23.400 --> 00:17:26.539
for the theater. Stilwell wanted to devote them

00:17:26.539 --> 00:17:29.819
to Burma and reforming the Chinese army, but

00:17:29.819 --> 00:17:31.539
Chenault wanted them for the 14th Air Force.

00:17:32.019 --> 00:17:35.240
Now, again, we have to admit that Chenault achieved

00:17:35.240 --> 00:17:37.440
notable successes in his air campaign in terms

00:17:37.440 --> 00:17:39.619
of the number of planes shot down, the number

00:17:39.619 --> 00:17:41.700
of targets they bombed, the number of ships sunk.

00:17:42.400 --> 00:17:45.180
And in that regard, and this is pretty much true

00:17:45.180 --> 00:17:46.799
throughout his career in China, Burma, India,

00:17:46.960 --> 00:17:48.819
he commanded one of the more successful efforts

00:17:48.819 --> 00:17:51.319
in that theater. There's no way around that.

00:17:52.039 --> 00:17:55.440
But he had vastly overpromised, because victory

00:17:55.440 --> 00:17:57.720
over the Japanese remained elusive during 1943,

00:17:57.859 --> 00:18:00.299
and even into a second campaign he tried to launch

00:18:00.299 --> 00:18:04.680
in 1944. And you can't control... territory with

00:18:04.680 --> 00:18:07.119
aircraft. With aircraft. And again, it's this

00:18:07.119 --> 00:18:08.839
thing that we discussed in the America's First

00:18:08.839 --> 00:18:11.000
series, that air power advocates are very good

00:18:11.000 --> 00:18:13.900
at technology and at targeting and, well, things

00:18:13.900 --> 00:18:15.400
like air tactics, right? Because that's what

00:18:15.400 --> 00:18:17.660
they do for a living. They're not that good,

00:18:17.680 --> 00:18:19.680
though, at applying that in a strategic sense

00:18:19.680 --> 00:18:21.900
to what's going on in the ground and on the water

00:18:21.900 --> 00:18:24.220
and those types of things. They don't seem to

00:18:24.220 --> 00:18:25.680
really take that into account very much. There's

00:18:25.680 --> 00:18:27.539
sort of an assumption that as long as we bomb

00:18:27.539 --> 00:18:29.720
enough stuff and shoot enough stuff down, we'll

00:18:29.720 --> 00:18:33.380
win. We will win the war. But how exactly is

00:18:33.380 --> 00:18:37.920
often not really explained. Well, they did not

00:18:37.920 --> 00:18:42.839
win the war. Meanwhile, Stilwell and the British

00:18:42.839 --> 00:18:45.339
finally had begun their campaign in northern

00:18:45.339 --> 00:18:49.220
Burma. This was around the beginning of 1944.

00:18:50.039 --> 00:18:52.359
You will remember that in the last episode, we

00:18:52.359 --> 00:18:54.400
discussed how Stilwell had been advocating this

00:18:54.400 --> 00:18:56.819
campaign in north Burma since the middle of 1942.

00:18:58.240 --> 00:19:00.990
Unlike Chennault, who wasn't really getting results,

00:19:01.289 --> 00:19:03.430
the campaign in Burma made a clear difference

00:19:03.430 --> 00:19:06.430
on the ground. Stillwell went into Burma, and

00:19:06.430 --> 00:19:08.549
remember I told you about Merrill's marauders.

00:19:08.569 --> 00:19:10.670
He took command of them in the field, in the

00:19:10.670 --> 00:19:14.069
jungles and mountains of Burma. He used them

00:19:14.069 --> 00:19:16.309
as a regular infantry force rather than as a

00:19:16.309 --> 00:19:18.130
commando force, and in tough fighting, cleared

00:19:18.130 --> 00:19:20.349
the path for the Lido Road and captured a key

00:19:20.349 --> 00:19:22.970
Japanese air base, which in turn made the over

00:19:22.970 --> 00:19:26.089
-the -hump air route safer from Japanese interception

00:19:26.089 --> 00:19:28.650
by Japanese fighters, and it also allowed planes

00:19:28.650 --> 00:19:30.960
on that route, to take a more direct and efficient

00:19:30.960 --> 00:19:33.559
path so they could carry more. I'm referring

00:19:33.559 --> 00:19:35.460
to a number of things we discussed in the last

00:19:35.460 --> 00:19:37.660
episode, in which we described the over -the

00:19:37.660 --> 00:19:41.019
-hump airlift from India to China, the Allies

00:19:41.019 --> 00:19:42.819
beginning the construction of the Lido Road,

00:19:42.960 --> 00:19:45.220
which was a new road to replace the Burma Road,

00:19:45.380 --> 00:19:47.839
and create a new overland route through northern

00:19:47.839 --> 00:19:50.539
Burma to supply China, and also how Stilwell

00:19:50.539 --> 00:19:52.440
and U .S. Army logistics planners viewed the

00:19:52.440 --> 00:19:54.480
opening of the Lido Road as the key to delivering

00:19:54.480 --> 00:19:57.240
supplies and equipment to China necessary for

00:19:57.240 --> 00:19:59.589
reforming the Nationalist Chinese forces. and

00:19:59.589 --> 00:20:01.890
how therefore a campaign to retake northern Burma

00:20:01.890 --> 00:20:04.750
and open a route for the Lido Road was a necessary

00:20:04.750 --> 00:20:07.369
precursor to Allied victory over the Japanese

00:20:07.369 --> 00:20:10.269
in China. So this victorious campaign in Burma

00:20:10.269 --> 00:20:12.750
in 1944 was a great step forward for Stilwell

00:20:12.750 --> 00:20:16.049
and his plans. This success in Burma contrasted

00:20:16.049 --> 00:20:17.990
with Chenault's failure to break the stalemate

00:20:17.990 --> 00:20:21.529
with Japan in China. Other things broke Stilwell's

00:20:21.529 --> 00:20:24.430
way too. Frustrated with Chung's demands and

00:20:24.430 --> 00:20:27.609
failure to take the offensive, FDR in 1944 began

00:20:27.609 --> 00:20:30.230
to adopt Stilwell's quid pro quo approach toward

00:20:30.230 --> 00:20:32.549
Chung. This is another thing we talked about

00:20:32.549 --> 00:20:35.630
in the last episode. Stilwell believed that the

00:20:35.630 --> 00:20:37.609
only way to get Chung Kai -shek to reform his

00:20:37.609 --> 00:20:39.450
government by stopping all of the corruption,

00:20:39.670 --> 00:20:42.890
or to reform his army, or to take offensive action

00:20:42.890 --> 00:20:45.769
against the Japanese in China, was to provide

00:20:45.769 --> 00:20:47.990
him with lend -lease supplies on a quid pro quo

00:20:47.990 --> 00:20:50.789
basis, under which Chung would receive aid only

00:20:50.789 --> 00:20:53.779
to the extent that he met U .S. demands for reform

00:20:53.779 --> 00:20:57.079
and offensive action. It contrasted with a softer

00:20:57.079 --> 00:20:59.000
approach to dealing with Chung, which Roosevelt

00:20:59.000 --> 00:21:02.279
had adopted in 1943, which held that Chung would

00:21:02.279 --> 00:21:03.960
eventually do what the United States wanted,

00:21:04.099 --> 00:21:06.599
if given time, and not face with too much pressure.

00:21:07.559 --> 00:21:09.359
Roosevelt's shift to the quid pro quo approach

00:21:09.359 --> 00:21:11.660
had at least some limited success in nudging

00:21:11.660 --> 00:21:16.400
Chung into action. He launched an offensive at

00:21:16.400 --> 00:21:19.119
one point, which did not succeed. But at least

00:21:19.119 --> 00:21:21.240
Chung did something for once after years of sitting

00:21:21.240 --> 00:21:22.819
back and doing little or nothing against the

00:21:22.819 --> 00:21:27.799
Japanese. In April 1944, the Japanese, as Stilwell

00:21:27.799 --> 00:21:30.380
had predicted, began something called Operation

00:21:30.380 --> 00:21:33.240
Ichigo. I looked it up. I thought that was some

00:21:33.240 --> 00:21:35.259
cool name like Victory Now or something. It turns

00:21:35.259 --> 00:21:37.859
out it just means number one. So, oh well. But

00:21:37.859 --> 00:21:40.359
anyway, the Japanese began Operation Ichigo.

00:21:40.839 --> 00:21:43.420
That was a major offensive to capture the 14th

00:21:43.420 --> 00:21:46.369
Air Force's bases. And it also wound up threatening

00:21:46.369 --> 00:21:48.430
the basis from which the Army Air Force's new

00:21:48.430 --> 00:21:51.430
B -29 Superfortress bombers had begun a strategic

00:21:51.430 --> 00:21:55.930
bombing campaign against Japan. For those who

00:21:55.930 --> 00:21:57.769
don't know, the B -29 is, you know, the Enola

00:21:57.769 --> 00:22:00.289
Gay that dropped the atomic bomb on Japan was

00:22:00.289 --> 00:22:05.049
a B -29. Also, as still a lot had predicted,

00:22:05.349 --> 00:22:08.170
the Chinese Army proved incapable of stopping

00:22:08.170 --> 00:22:11.440
the Japanese. And by the time Ichigo ended in

00:22:11.440 --> 00:22:13.640
December 1944, the Japanese had captured much

00:22:13.640 --> 00:22:16.019
of southern China, which was the first major

00:22:16.019 --> 00:22:18.160
change in the front lines in China since 1939.

00:22:19.920 --> 00:22:22.259
This all culminated in an ultimatum to Chung

00:22:22.259 --> 00:22:24.299
Kai -shek from Roosevelt, demanding that Stilwell

00:22:24.299 --> 00:22:26.380
be given command of Chung's army in September

00:22:26.380 --> 00:22:30.240
1944. But when Chung rejected the ultimatum and

00:22:30.240 --> 00:22:32.759
instead demanded that Stilwell be relieved, FDR,

00:22:33.079 --> 00:22:36.740
who did not want to lose China, gave in. and

00:22:36.740 --> 00:22:38.539
Stillwell was recalled to the United States in

00:22:38.539 --> 00:22:43.000
October 1944. Trucks began using the Lido Road

00:22:43.000 --> 00:22:46.099
in January 1945, and by the end of the war in

00:22:46.099 --> 00:22:48.319
August 1945, they had delivered thousands of

00:22:48.319 --> 00:22:51.200
tons of supplies to Chungking. In early 1945,

00:22:51.859 --> 00:22:53.980
the Lido Road was renamed the Stillwell Road

00:22:53.980 --> 00:22:56.460
in honor of Joseph Stillwell, at the suggestion

00:22:56.460 --> 00:22:59.240
of Chungkai Shek, of all people. So perhaps there

00:22:59.240 --> 00:23:01.859
was some respect there after all. But Chenault

00:23:01.859 --> 00:23:03.859
advocates point out that the airlift succeeded

00:23:03.859 --> 00:23:06.339
in delivering seven times as much per month as

00:23:06.339 --> 00:23:08.700
the trucks ever did, which they think vindicates

00:23:08.700 --> 00:23:11.279
Chenault's view that Stilwell's campaign in North

00:23:11.279 --> 00:23:13.420
Burma and the construction of the Lido Road were

00:23:13.420 --> 00:23:17.440
unnecessary. Chenault remained in China until

00:23:17.440 --> 00:23:21.000
July 1945, before he also was recalled. The Chinese

00:23:21.000 --> 00:23:22.819
had some success in offensive ground operations

00:23:22.819 --> 00:23:26.200
in China during 1945, but in the end, the Japanese

00:23:26.200 --> 00:23:28.960
were defeated in Burma and the Pacific, but not

00:23:28.960 --> 00:23:31.319
in China. where they controlled significant territory

00:23:31.319 --> 00:23:33.819
until their troops withdrew after the end of

00:23:33.819 --> 00:23:50.079
World War II in August 1945. So in researching

00:23:50.079 --> 00:23:54.710
all of this, You know, I found a number of things

00:23:54.710 --> 00:23:57.609
about the historiography that we should point

00:23:57.609 --> 00:24:00.630
out. And I think to some extent it clouds everyone's

00:24:00.630 --> 00:24:03.549
vision about what was going on in China. So what

00:24:03.549 --> 00:24:08.309
I mean by that is a lot of the historiography

00:24:08.309 --> 00:24:11.269
winds up focusing on the dispute between Stilwell

00:24:11.269 --> 00:24:13.390
and Chiang Kai -shek. And for good reason, because

00:24:13.390 --> 00:24:16.549
that was a driving force in what happened in

00:24:16.549 --> 00:24:21.799
CBI during the war. support and defend Stilwell

00:24:21.799 --> 00:24:24.420
and Chenault in their argument against each other,

00:24:24.579 --> 00:24:27.940
which is the United States having an argument

00:24:27.940 --> 00:24:30.119
with itself rather than really discussing China.

00:24:30.579 --> 00:24:33.200
My understanding is the received historiography

00:24:33.200 --> 00:24:36.500
up until the 1990s just focused on the idea that

00:24:36.500 --> 00:24:38.880
Chenault's successes were not in and of themselves

00:24:38.880 --> 00:24:42.400
decisive, fair enough, and that Stilwell was

00:24:42.400 --> 00:24:45.099
right all along. It's kind of the way this comes

00:24:45.099 --> 00:24:47.480
across, that if we'd just done what Stilwell

00:24:47.480 --> 00:24:49.839
said, maybe that would have worked. Well, you'd

00:24:49.839 --> 00:24:51.839
also have to have Chiang Kai -shek go along with

00:24:51.839 --> 00:24:55.299
what Stilwell said. That's what I'm getting to,

00:24:55.440 --> 00:24:57.839
though, is that it focuses too much on whether

00:24:57.839 --> 00:25:01.220
Stilwell or Chennault were right. But all that

00:25:01.220 --> 00:25:02.700
really mattered was what did Chiang Kai -shek

00:25:02.700 --> 00:25:05.920
want to do? He wanted to do the thing that would

00:25:05.920 --> 00:25:08.279
allow him to expend the fewest resources and

00:25:08.279 --> 00:25:09.880
get the Japanese out without really having to

00:25:09.880 --> 00:25:13.519
fight them at all. And have the U .S. and British

00:25:13.519 --> 00:25:15.039
do most of the heavy lifting. Do most of the

00:25:15.039 --> 00:25:17.980
heavy lifting. But we're getting a little bit

00:25:17.980 --> 00:25:19.519
ahead of ourselves because what I wanted to say

00:25:19.519 --> 00:25:23.660
was that that's kind of the, what's the right

00:25:23.660 --> 00:25:26.119
word, the traditional historiography. That's

00:25:26.119 --> 00:25:27.839
what the U .S. Army official history of World

00:25:27.839 --> 00:25:30.680
War II, that's what it conveys in its three volumes

00:25:30.680 --> 00:25:33.539
on CBI. And my understanding is the Barbara Tuchman

00:25:33.539 --> 00:25:36.819
book also generally takes that tone. I saw one

00:25:36.819 --> 00:25:40.259
person saying that, you know, it was actually

00:25:40.259 --> 00:25:41.900
kind of a critique of Tuchman's book where there

00:25:41.900 --> 00:25:45.019
was someone saying, Tuchman's book. was a very

00:25:45.019 --> 00:25:47.059
good book that reflected the thinking up until

00:25:47.059 --> 00:25:51.279
the early 1990s, the consensus, the historiographical

00:25:51.279 --> 00:25:58.339
consensus. But since the 1990s, a different historiography,

00:25:58.500 --> 00:26:01.160
a different way of looking at this has cropped

00:26:01.160 --> 00:26:05.279
up. One idea is that maybe Tuckman was too heavily

00:26:05.279 --> 00:26:07.500
influenced by Stilwell's diaries, which of course

00:26:07.500 --> 00:26:10.019
make him sound good because it's his diary. Well,

00:26:10.019 --> 00:26:13.240
also— And the Army official history is a ground

00:26:13.240 --> 00:26:15.359
force's history, right? And Chenault had been

00:26:15.359 --> 00:26:17.559
an Air Force guy, so the Air Force official history

00:26:17.559 --> 00:26:19.150
is going to talk about how great— Chenault was,

00:26:19.369 --> 00:26:21.150
but the army history is going to focus more on

00:26:21.150 --> 00:26:23.289
the ground campaign and the ground aspect. So

00:26:23.289 --> 00:26:26.210
you're going to get a biased view from those

00:26:26.210 --> 00:26:28.130
two sources. That's what the new historiography

00:26:28.130 --> 00:26:30.569
is saying. Well, I would add to that is that

00:26:30.569 --> 00:26:34.309
Tuchman's book is written, published in 1971,

00:26:34.609 --> 00:26:38.569
and it reflects a kind of Vietnam era mentality.

00:26:39.410 --> 00:26:43.990
So Vietnam era mentality is related to nation

00:26:43.990 --> 00:26:49.390
building and trying to set up U .S. similar institutions

00:26:49.390 --> 00:26:54.890
and ways of doing things and procedures in countries

00:26:54.890 --> 00:26:57.829
which have no experience with those kinds of

00:26:57.829 --> 00:27:00.690
things. And this was something that underpinned

00:27:00.690 --> 00:27:03.250
a lot of the assumptions we made when going into

00:27:03.250 --> 00:27:06.190
South Vietnam. Ultimately, it comes down on the

00:27:06.190 --> 00:27:11.190
fact she will present still well, and she will

00:27:11.190 --> 00:27:15.970
draw heavily on the diaries. Does not think,

00:27:15.970 --> 00:27:18.289
though, that Stilwell was the ideal person for

00:27:18.289 --> 00:27:23.769
the job. I mean, she does view him heroically.

00:27:23.930 --> 00:27:27.210
He was not. He was not. But ultimately, that

00:27:27.210 --> 00:27:29.390
is her opinion. That is her take on this, that

00:27:29.390 --> 00:27:31.869
she thinks Stilwell is a great guy and everything,

00:27:32.049 --> 00:27:34.069
but he is not the guy who should have been given

00:27:34.069 --> 00:27:38.490
this job. So in that sense, I would say that

00:27:38.490 --> 00:27:41.069
even though the historiography might have moved

00:27:41.069 --> 00:27:44.069
on, I still see a lot of value in this book because

00:27:44.069 --> 00:27:49.470
she actually takes into account the context that

00:27:49.470 --> 00:27:52.589
Stilwell is operating under and basically saying

00:27:52.589 --> 00:27:57.910
that Stilwell is kind of, you know, in a sort

00:27:57.910 --> 00:28:01.490
of Don Quixote type role tilting at windmills

00:28:01.490 --> 00:28:06.160
here. And trying to swim upstream against all

00:28:06.160 --> 00:28:09.420
of this corruption, all of these issues. And

00:28:09.420 --> 00:28:11.779
it's kind of surprising, though, what's really

00:28:11.779 --> 00:28:14.319
interesting with this whole thing. It's not like

00:28:14.319 --> 00:28:18.119
Stilwell just got dropped into China all by himself.

00:28:18.180 --> 00:28:22.940
Stilwell should have known better in some respects

00:28:22.940 --> 00:28:25.880
because Stilwell's experience goes back to 1911.

00:28:26.119 --> 00:28:33.119
He was also the military attaché. In terms of

00:28:33.119 --> 00:28:35.059
dealing with this. And so he should have had

00:28:35.059 --> 00:28:37.500
a better sense of what he was dealing with. He

00:28:37.500 --> 00:28:40.519
certainly knew that he wanted to reform it, but

00:28:40.519 --> 00:28:43.359
he didn't quite seem to grasp the power dynamics,

00:28:43.420 --> 00:28:47.440
which you would think he would be able to do.

00:28:47.660 --> 00:28:50.059
Well, he did something that Americans tend to

00:28:50.059 --> 00:28:52.400
do. Americans tend to assume that everybody out

00:28:52.400 --> 00:28:55.359
there is trying to be Americans. That's their

00:28:55.359 --> 00:28:57.640
aspiration. Their aspiration is to be like us.

00:28:57.859 --> 00:29:00.160
And the fact that they're not there yet. Usually

00:29:00.160 --> 00:29:02.140
means like their government is corrupt or something

00:29:02.140 --> 00:29:04.180
is wrong like that. But they want to be like

00:29:04.180 --> 00:29:07.480
us. So he goes out and he looks at the nationalist

00:29:07.480 --> 00:29:09.960
government and he says, well, they're all corrupt.

00:29:10.859 --> 00:29:12.779
You're not going to get the best results out

00:29:12.779 --> 00:29:15.740
of them. The communists are these good agrarian

00:29:15.740 --> 00:29:17.559
reformers, democratically inclined. Maybe they

00:29:17.559 --> 00:29:19.640
would do it. But fundamentally underneath all

00:29:19.640 --> 00:29:22.559
that is an idea that China is an America waiting

00:29:22.559 --> 00:29:25.420
to happen. And Americans do that over and over

00:29:25.420 --> 00:29:27.559
again all the time because we've been trying

00:29:27.559 --> 00:29:30.299
to export our revolution around the world since

00:29:30.299 --> 00:29:33.480
1776. And here we go again. We're always looking

00:29:33.480 --> 00:29:35.480
for the George Washington of that country who's

00:29:35.480 --> 00:29:37.799
going to lead them up and make them into a country

00:29:37.799 --> 00:29:40.900
just like ours. And I think that in Stilwell's

00:29:40.900 --> 00:29:44.000
case, that might explain why he overlooked all

00:29:44.000 --> 00:29:45.299
these things like you're talking about, like

00:29:45.299 --> 00:29:47.059
he should have known better, because it's a deep

00:29:47.059 --> 00:29:48.680
emotional thing that a lot of Americans have.

00:29:49.440 --> 00:29:51.940
Everybody wants to be like us. Well, Chiang Kai

00:29:51.940 --> 00:29:54.859
-shek and Madam Chiang Kai -shek. And I mean,

00:29:54.880 --> 00:29:57.200
this is where, you know, where I emphasize the

00:29:57.200 --> 00:30:01.140
Song family before. They are a product of, you

00:30:01.140 --> 00:30:06.099
know, U .S. Methodist education. I mean, this

00:30:06.099 --> 00:30:08.380
education gave them a very good understanding

00:30:08.380 --> 00:30:11.339
of who they were dealing with when they dealt

00:30:11.339 --> 00:30:13.859
with the United States. Madam Chiang Kai -shek

00:30:13.859 --> 00:30:16.619
spoke English fluently. She was actually Chiang

00:30:16.619 --> 00:30:18.799
Kai -shek's interpreter, as well as being in

00:30:18.799 --> 00:30:21.259
charge of the Air Force. But she was actually

00:30:21.259 --> 00:30:23.180
a fairly influential figure. She got to stay

00:30:23.180 --> 00:30:24.779
over at the White House whenever she'd come.

00:30:24.880 --> 00:30:28.279
An honor only Winston Churchill would have been

00:30:28.279 --> 00:30:32.880
given at that point. They, the Soongs. Yes, the

00:30:32.880 --> 00:30:36.480
Soongs. They knew what they were dealing with.

00:30:37.279 --> 00:30:41.099
They understood what U .S. aspirations were.

00:30:41.900 --> 00:30:44.599
When influential Americans visited China, say

00:30:44.599 --> 00:30:47.039
when Henry Luce came through. Henry Luce, remember,

00:30:47.259 --> 00:30:49.259
the publisher we discussed a couple of episodes

00:30:49.259 --> 00:30:53.140
ago. Chang and Madame Chang and the Song family

00:30:53.140 --> 00:30:55.839
would present them with a whole dog and pony

00:30:55.839 --> 00:30:58.279
show, telling them how the nationalist government

00:30:58.279 --> 00:31:02.099
was modernizing and Christianizing China. And

00:31:02.099 --> 00:31:04.059
this is ridiculous when you think about it. There

00:31:04.059 --> 00:31:06.720
is no democratic tradition in China. There aren't

00:31:06.720 --> 00:31:09.700
democratic institutions in China. And the literacy

00:31:09.700 --> 00:31:12.599
rate is only 20 percent of the population at

00:31:12.599 --> 00:31:16.099
best. 80 percent of it is illiterate. It's illiterate.

00:31:16.480 --> 00:31:20.640
And it's like you cannot have democratic government

00:31:20.640 --> 00:31:24.309
cannot be imposed on a. from on high, which is

00:31:24.309 --> 00:31:27.589
a mistake we continually make, not just in China,

00:31:27.589 --> 00:31:29.849
but other parts of the world. Although I think

00:31:29.849 --> 00:31:32.210
China, the reason I wanted us to do China is

00:31:32.210 --> 00:31:35.450
because I feel like China is a perfect example

00:31:35.450 --> 00:31:39.690
of things that we continue to do and do over

00:31:39.690 --> 00:31:43.210
again in a wrong -headed fashion, which, you

00:31:43.210 --> 00:31:45.690
know, this is part of the whole Vietnam heritage.

00:31:46.400 --> 00:31:48.460
At the same time, Barbara Tuckman was writing

00:31:48.460 --> 00:31:50.980
her book about Stilwell. There was criticism

00:31:50.980 --> 00:31:54.279
in the United States about what we were doing

00:31:54.279 --> 00:31:57.579
in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, which

00:31:57.579 --> 00:32:00.779
was seen to be a repeat of all the mistakes we'd

00:32:00.779 --> 00:32:03.980
made in China regarding nation building. Yeah,

00:32:04.000 --> 00:32:06.359
because that was a nation building event in South

00:32:06.359 --> 00:32:08.160
Vietnam. Yes, it's more nation building. It's

00:32:08.160 --> 00:32:12.359
all kind of nation building. Now, in China, I

00:32:12.359 --> 00:32:14.059
don't think you can say that we were really trying

00:32:14.059 --> 00:32:16.519
to engage in nation building there. But what

00:32:16.519 --> 00:32:19.319
we were trying to do is give this nation an army

00:32:19.319 --> 00:32:22.539
that would fight well or defeat the Japanese

00:32:22.539 --> 00:32:25.299
for this nation without really taking into account

00:32:25.299 --> 00:32:27.579
how this nation wasn't what we thought it was

00:32:27.579 --> 00:32:31.599
at all. But also we're promoting. democracy,

00:32:31.839 --> 00:32:35.339
which is what Chiang Kai -shek and Madam Chiang

00:32:35.339 --> 00:32:38.420
Kai -shek are saying. They claim to be doing

00:32:38.420 --> 00:32:41.700
that. We claim that this is what, they're not

00:32:41.700 --> 00:32:44.619
there yet, but this is their goal. And there's

00:32:44.619 --> 00:32:47.619
also, and you cannot emphasize this too much,

00:32:47.759 --> 00:32:50.240
there's also the religious aspect of this where

00:32:50.240 --> 00:32:54.559
both Chiang and Madam Chiang are Christians.

00:32:55.379 --> 00:32:59.099
and a country that is, and they're going to go

00:32:59.099 --> 00:33:02.039
and Christianize China. And then we're going

00:33:02.039 --> 00:33:03.660
to get like the second coming of the Lord and

00:33:03.660 --> 00:33:07.940
all of that kind of stuff too. Let's talk about

00:33:07.940 --> 00:33:09.660
the communists, because I would say that the

00:33:09.660 --> 00:33:12.259
communists are also playing this game as well.

00:33:12.579 --> 00:33:15.160
This gets into another big misunderstanding.

00:33:15.380 --> 00:33:18.759
Yes. Which Stilwell and those China hands are

00:33:18.759 --> 00:33:21.640
referred to got wrong. The impression, and you'll

00:33:21.640 --> 00:33:24.319
still hear this from people today. was that the

00:33:24.319 --> 00:33:25.960
communists actually did most of the fighting.

00:33:25.980 --> 00:33:29.500
They really fought the Japanese hard. In 1941,

00:33:29.599 --> 00:33:31.819
they did have an offensive they launched. So

00:33:31.819 --> 00:33:33.240
it's not like they never fought the Japanese

00:33:33.240 --> 00:33:35.980
because they did at least they had one big offensive.

00:33:36.380 --> 00:33:38.279
They did engage in a lot of guerrilla warfare

00:33:38.279 --> 00:33:40.660
against Japanese forces. And political organizing.

00:33:40.779 --> 00:33:44.759
They did do that. But how much did they really

00:33:44.759 --> 00:33:48.740
do? If you listen to Stilwell, you'll hear that,

00:33:48.799 --> 00:33:50.579
well, they did all the fighting and the nationalists

00:33:50.579 --> 00:33:54.210
did virtually none. Now, Chenault advocates would

00:33:54.210 --> 00:33:56.410
tell you, because I saw one say this in one of

00:33:56.410 --> 00:33:58.309
his articles, that the nationalists actually

00:33:58.309 --> 00:34:00.829
suffered 600 ,000 casualties during the time

00:34:00.829 --> 00:34:03.369
when the front line was frozen between 1938 and

00:34:03.369 --> 00:34:06.930
1944. Now, they don't break down how many of

00:34:06.930 --> 00:34:08.809
those casualties were due to combat with the

00:34:08.809 --> 00:34:11.090
Japanese, how many were just illness, because

00:34:11.090 --> 00:34:13.250
China had no medical service in its army. When

00:34:13.250 --> 00:34:14.590
you were sick, you were just sick on your own.

00:34:14.730 --> 00:34:17.070
You died. You died. You know, it doesn't break

00:34:17.070 --> 00:34:19.710
all that. that down. Surely they were doing some

00:34:19.710 --> 00:34:22.670
fighting. And in fact, even though the front

00:34:22.670 --> 00:34:26.110
lines were frozen, you did have combat happen.

00:34:26.250 --> 00:34:28.949
And kind of the way it played out was once in

00:34:28.949 --> 00:34:30.590
a while, the Japanese would decide to try their

00:34:30.590 --> 00:34:32.210
hand at fighting the Chinese just to kind of

00:34:32.210 --> 00:34:34.110
keep in practice. And they'd launch a small offensive.

00:34:34.849 --> 00:34:36.750
What the Chinese would tend to do, the nationalists

00:34:36.750 --> 00:34:38.210
would tend to like fall back, let them take the

00:34:38.210 --> 00:34:39.929
territory, you know, do a little bit of shooting.

00:34:40.050 --> 00:34:42.010
Then the Japanese would pull back to more or

00:34:42.010 --> 00:34:44.150
less their original lines because they could

00:34:44.150 --> 00:34:46.570
not or did not want to hold the territory they

00:34:46.570 --> 00:34:48.710
had captured. And then the nationalist Chinese

00:34:48.710 --> 00:34:50.849
would move back into the area the Japanese had

00:34:50.849 --> 00:34:52.690
withdrawn from, and things would settle back

00:34:52.690 --> 00:34:54.909
into a stalemate again. So there was kind of

00:34:54.909 --> 00:34:56.110
this thing where there was fighting, there was

00:34:56.110 --> 00:34:58.510
some give and take going on. Nothing major was

00:34:58.510 --> 00:35:00.010
happening in terms of changing the lines on the

00:35:00.010 --> 00:35:16.360
map. So yes, there was fighting. Yes, the nationalists

00:35:16.360 --> 00:35:18.099
no doubt suffered some casualties during that

00:35:18.099 --> 00:35:20.380
fighting. Maybe there were several hundred thousand.

00:35:20.559 --> 00:35:22.760
I don't really know. Well, you know, one of the

00:35:22.760 --> 00:35:27.119
critical things to look at is where is the main

00:35:27.119 --> 00:35:29.619
level of effort on the part of the Japanese?

00:35:30.579 --> 00:35:35.239
If we go through and just follow this notion

00:35:35.239 --> 00:35:37.559
that, oh, it's the communists that are doing

00:35:37.559 --> 00:35:40.559
most of the fighting, then you would expect to

00:35:40.559 --> 00:35:44.699
see a major level of effort. directed against

00:35:44.699 --> 00:35:48.539
the Chinese communists, but that is not the case.

00:35:48.539 --> 00:35:51.059
The major level of effort is directed against

00:35:51.059 --> 00:35:54.000
the nationalists. And the Chinese communists

00:35:54.000 --> 00:35:58.099
are doing their thing, and they are trying to

00:35:58.099 --> 00:36:04.099
say the right things. They surely know how frustrating

00:36:04.099 --> 00:36:06.960
it is to deal with Chiang Kai -shek. And they

00:36:06.960 --> 00:36:09.420
surely know what the right things are to say

00:36:09.420 --> 00:36:13.579
to State Department, political officers, and

00:36:13.579 --> 00:36:16.280
so forth. And, you know, communicate with General

00:36:16.280 --> 00:36:18.380
Stilwell. I mean, when you're dealing with someone

00:36:18.380 --> 00:36:22.639
like Zhou Enlai, and Zhou Enlai was probably

00:36:22.639 --> 00:36:26.150
the most positive. member of the Communist Party

00:36:26.150 --> 00:36:28.650
in terms of being able to communicate with Westerners

00:36:28.650 --> 00:36:33.030
on an international level, very appealing, even

00:36:33.030 --> 00:36:36.849
appealing now within China. He knew how to play

00:36:36.849 --> 00:36:40.690
Americans. And I would argue that what you have

00:36:40.690 --> 00:36:42.789
is you have Americans coming in with the best

00:36:42.789 --> 00:36:45.929
of intentions, and you have the communists and

00:36:45.929 --> 00:36:48.469
you have the nationalists basically attempting

00:36:48.469 --> 00:36:51.969
to gain some sort of advantage to take advantage

00:36:51.969 --> 00:36:57.989
of U .S. biases in these cases. And I think that's

00:36:57.989 --> 00:37:00.909
actually close to the truth. I mean, like with

00:37:00.909 --> 00:37:02.989
the China hands, which we'll get into in the

00:37:02.989 --> 00:37:06.969
next episode, they are perceived as being martyrs.

00:37:07.329 --> 00:37:09.989
And to a certain extent, that is correct. They

00:37:09.989 --> 00:37:15.030
were right about how ineffective Chiang's government

00:37:15.030 --> 00:37:18.719
was. And in the United States, they were blamed

00:37:18.719 --> 00:37:21.199
for being pro -communist elements of the U .S.

00:37:21.219 --> 00:37:23.880
government who lost China, at least according

00:37:23.880 --> 00:37:27.800
to pro -Chang elements within the United States.

00:37:28.099 --> 00:37:29.800
We're going to get into the details of that next

00:37:29.800 --> 00:37:33.659
time. Yes, but the point is, Chang was not as

00:37:33.659 --> 00:37:36.840
competent as he was portrayed. And this is where

00:37:36.840 --> 00:37:40.940
you get the shock for having lost China. So here's

00:37:40.940 --> 00:37:44.599
the thing. The newer historiography doesn't excuse

00:37:44.599 --> 00:37:47.599
Chiang Kai -shek. ennoble him or make him a hero

00:37:47.599 --> 00:37:51.119
or anything but it does it does tend to say that

00:37:51.119 --> 00:37:54.219
to just focus on chung kai shek was corrupt wouldn't

00:37:54.219 --> 00:37:57.639
listen to stillwell and was just saving up his

00:37:57.639 --> 00:38:00.920
uh len lisaid to use against the communists someday

00:38:00.920 --> 00:38:03.619
right that that that does that's only like half

00:38:03.619 --> 00:38:06.599
the story in other words if you're chung kai

00:38:06.599 --> 00:38:08.860
shek though what else would you do you're operating

00:38:08.860 --> 00:38:11.980
within the system that you right you had a system

00:38:11.980 --> 00:38:14.920
and we talked about this earlier where You had

00:38:14.920 --> 00:38:16.860
to have corruption for people to get paid enough.

00:38:17.099 --> 00:38:20.079
You had to distribute aid among people, just

00:38:20.079 --> 00:38:22.739
among other generals, just to make them stay

00:38:22.739 --> 00:38:25.650
on your side. you had to refrain from using that

00:38:25.650 --> 00:38:27.909
stuff in combat, because if you used it in combat,

00:38:27.989 --> 00:38:29.469
you might wind up empowering one of the other

00:38:29.469 --> 00:38:31.570
generals, you might wind up losing the equipment

00:38:31.570 --> 00:38:33.849
that you were trying to save up. So it's an idea

00:38:33.849 --> 00:38:36.690
that doesn't excuse Chiang Kai -shek, but it's

00:38:36.690 --> 00:38:38.969
more along the lines of... It explains it. What

00:38:38.969 --> 00:38:41.190
were the Americans thinking? Why did they realize

00:38:41.190 --> 00:38:43.190
that this would have been the case, that this

00:38:43.190 --> 00:38:45.010
is what Chiang Kai -shek was going to do? They're

00:38:45.010 --> 00:38:47.210
not understanding the system. They're not understanding

00:38:47.210 --> 00:38:50.860
the system. And it's layer upon layer of these

00:38:50.860 --> 00:38:52.719
things. So like Stilwell's attitude about the

00:38:52.719 --> 00:38:54.920
communists, for example, right? We were talking

00:38:54.920 --> 00:38:57.320
about that. They were focused on prepping for

00:38:57.320 --> 00:38:59.019
fighting with the nationalists. Oh, yeah. They

00:38:59.019 --> 00:39:01.000
were. They weren't doing most of the fighting

00:39:01.000 --> 00:39:04.119
against the Japanese. I don't really know where

00:39:04.119 --> 00:39:06.139
these figures come from, to be honest with you.

00:39:06.179 --> 00:39:08.519
I do know I saw them in an article. So take this

00:39:08.519 --> 00:39:11.219
with a grain of salt. But I did see an article

00:39:11.219 --> 00:39:15.769
that said that the evidence is that the... between

00:39:15.769 --> 00:39:18.369
1937 and 1939, which was the time of the major

00:39:18.369 --> 00:39:21.110
early Japanese military operations, really only

00:39:21.110 --> 00:39:23.449
suffered about 2 % to 3 % of the casualties the

00:39:23.449 --> 00:39:26.469
Chinese suffered. All the other ones were nationalist

00:39:26.469 --> 00:39:28.889
losses. Well, if you think about how the two

00:39:28.889 --> 00:39:31.349
sides are fighting, there's much more conventional

00:39:31.349 --> 00:39:35.610
force -on -force fighting with the nationalists.

00:39:35.610 --> 00:39:37.090
The communists were engaged in guerrilla warfare

00:39:37.090 --> 00:39:38.730
and things, right? So of course you're going

00:39:38.730 --> 00:39:40.369
to have lower casualties. They're doing hit -and

00:39:40.369 --> 00:39:43.579
-goes. But the thing about it is... they weren't

00:39:43.579 --> 00:39:45.139
doing most of the fighting. No, they're not.

00:39:45.340 --> 00:39:47.199
They're not supermen who don't die when you shoot

00:39:47.199 --> 00:39:49.119
them. If you only suffer 2 -3 % of the casualties,

00:39:49.219 --> 00:39:51.119
you couldn't possibly be doing all that much

00:39:51.119 --> 00:39:53.400
of the fighting, is kind of the counter -argument.

00:39:53.780 --> 00:39:58.300
And in fact, I think it was Mao, Mao sent a secret

00:39:58.300 --> 00:40:01.519
directive out to his commanders and his leaders,

00:40:01.659 --> 00:40:04.440
and he said, during the war with the Japanese,

00:40:04.760 --> 00:40:10.139
our focus is 70 % on expansion, 20 % on dealing

00:40:10.139 --> 00:40:13.610
with the nationalists, And only 10 % on fighting

00:40:13.610 --> 00:40:15.849
the Japanese. Yes. So their focus was not fighting

00:40:15.849 --> 00:40:17.929
the Japanese. Yeah. They and the nationalists

00:40:17.929 --> 00:40:19.329
are circling around each other doing the same

00:40:19.329 --> 00:40:21.869
thing, getting ready for the war that was to

00:40:21.869 --> 00:40:24.610
come after the Japanese left someday. And from

00:40:24.610 --> 00:40:26.690
their perspective, even though Americans might

00:40:26.690 --> 00:40:28.869
hate to hear it, it makes sense if you look at

00:40:28.869 --> 00:40:30.849
it from their perspective. Yes. That makes a

00:40:30.849 --> 00:40:32.929
lot of sense. Why should I get all beat up when

00:40:32.929 --> 00:40:34.630
I can rely on other people to go beat the enemy

00:40:34.630 --> 00:40:37.320
up for me? And he'll leave and then I can fight

00:40:37.320 --> 00:40:39.579
my real enemy. Barbarians fighting barbarians.

00:40:39.579 --> 00:40:42.239
Use the barbarians to fight the other barbarians.

00:40:42.320 --> 00:40:45.719
So we have to consider all of that, I think.

00:40:46.139 --> 00:40:48.679
And when I look at it, it's not like the original

00:40:48.679 --> 00:40:51.599
historiography in the Army official history and

00:40:51.599 --> 00:40:53.159
Barbara Tuchman's book. And so people know what

00:40:53.159 --> 00:40:54.840
we're talking about. We're talking about Barbara

00:40:54.840 --> 00:40:57.420
Tuchman's Still Well and the American Experience

00:40:57.420 --> 00:41:00.159
in China. Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for History

00:41:00.159 --> 00:41:03.519
in 1972. In 1972. Published in 71. Yeah. Correct?

00:41:03.599 --> 00:41:04.900
Yeah, right. So that's the book we're talking

00:41:04.900 --> 00:41:08.380
about. Those books aren't wrong, but they may

00:41:08.380 --> 00:41:11.079
not be including all these other elements you

00:41:11.079 --> 00:41:12.980
have to consider, which doesn't excuse Trunk

00:41:12.980 --> 00:41:16.210
Ishak, but it explains him better. And also,

00:41:16.269 --> 00:41:18.869
in my opinion from doing the research, so many

00:41:18.869 --> 00:41:20.750
people are focused on who was right, Stilwell

00:41:20.750 --> 00:41:23.690
or Chenault. You know, should we have done quid

00:41:23.690 --> 00:41:26.070
pro quos or gone easier on Chiang Kai -shek?

00:41:26.409 --> 00:41:28.250
Should we have opened the Burma Road or should

00:41:28.250 --> 00:41:30.030
we have focused on Chenault with the 14th Air

00:41:30.030 --> 00:41:32.889
Force? Should we have done those things? But

00:41:32.889 --> 00:41:35.090
like I said before, those are Americans arguing

00:41:35.090 --> 00:41:37.250
with themselves about how to beat the Japanese

00:41:37.250 --> 00:41:42.050
in China. It isn't a discussion of how, really,

00:41:42.269 --> 00:41:45.539
of how we're going to be. Or what China's goals

00:41:45.539 --> 00:41:47.159
are, what China's trying to achieve. And how

00:41:47.159 --> 00:41:48.420
effective we can be with China. And how effective

00:41:48.420 --> 00:41:52.019
we can be with China. And in fact, I had a thought,

00:41:52.079 --> 00:41:54.159
and I didn't read this anywhere. It's just me,

00:41:54.159 --> 00:41:56.760
and maybe I'm dumb to bring it up. But one of

00:41:56.760 --> 00:41:58.280
the thoughts I had after looking at all of this

00:41:58.280 --> 00:42:02.639
was, let's do a counterfactual. What if there

00:42:02.639 --> 00:42:05.619
had been no communist movement in China? what

00:42:05.619 --> 00:42:07.539
if it was the nationalists and they had all their

00:42:07.539 --> 00:42:09.980
issues with warlords, you know, fighting warlords

00:42:09.980 --> 00:42:11.500
and trying to, you know, put together some kind

00:42:11.500 --> 00:42:13.460
of government under Chung or whoever else. What

00:42:13.460 --> 00:42:16.179
if they were doing all that and then the Japanese

00:42:16.179 --> 00:42:18.739
invaded and the Japanese had the success that

00:42:18.739 --> 00:42:22.719
they wound up having and then we enter World

00:42:22.719 --> 00:42:24.500
War II and we want to defeat the Japanese and

00:42:24.500 --> 00:42:25.960
we're dealing with a Chung Kai -shek who has

00:42:25.960 --> 00:42:28.800
no communist insurgency to prepare for in the

00:42:28.800 --> 00:42:30.900
future. You with me? Yes. He doesn't have that.

00:42:31.400 --> 00:42:33.440
Would Chiang Kai -shek have behaved any differently

00:42:33.440 --> 00:42:35.739
in that scenario? No, because the warlords would

00:42:35.739 --> 00:42:39.239
have occupied the same niche as the communists.

00:42:39.239 --> 00:42:41.980
So almost in a way, I guess what I'm trying to

00:42:41.980 --> 00:42:44.300
say here is, almost in a way, by focusing so

00:42:44.300 --> 00:42:46.519
much on how Chiang Kai -shek was saving up his

00:42:46.519 --> 00:42:49.599
resources to fight the communists, that's true,

00:42:49.800 --> 00:42:53.280
but it almost misses another point, an even deeper

00:42:53.280 --> 00:42:56.039
point. Whether communists existed in China or

00:42:56.039 --> 00:42:58.059
not, Chiang Kai -shek would still have had warlords

00:42:58.059 --> 00:42:59.820
to deal with and would still have behaved the

00:42:59.820 --> 00:43:02.360
same way. And this leads me to that deeper point,

00:43:02.460 --> 00:43:05.519
which is that you're dealing with the army of

00:43:05.519 --> 00:43:08.760
a, almost like a feudal system, a feudal kind

00:43:08.760 --> 00:43:11.039
of an army, with a bunch of different liege lords

00:43:11.039 --> 00:43:15.059
who have mixed loyalties to each other. And it's

00:43:15.059 --> 00:43:17.519
not a national army fighting for a Chinese national

00:43:17.519 --> 00:43:20.820
state in the way we were, everybody on our side

00:43:20.820 --> 00:43:27.000
was. FDR. Lachlan Curry, Stilwell, Chennault,

00:43:27.119 --> 00:43:30.019
you name them, anybody, right? All of us on the

00:43:30.019 --> 00:43:32.900
U .S. side of this were making a false assumption

00:43:32.900 --> 00:43:35.980
that this is a national government with a national

00:43:35.980 --> 00:43:39.400
army, which had as its goal liberating China

00:43:39.400 --> 00:43:42.119
from the Japanese. Because that's how we would

00:43:42.119 --> 00:43:43.460
think, and that's what we would do. Yes, and

00:43:43.460 --> 00:43:47.079
that is completely not their goal. And again,

00:43:47.300 --> 00:43:49.980
we're giving Chiang, during the time, we're giving

00:43:49.980 --> 00:43:53.420
Chiang far more credit. for being, you know,

00:43:53.420 --> 00:43:56.940
say a co -equal with, say, Churchill, they are

00:43:56.940 --> 00:43:58.960
not the same. Well, that's because Roosevelt

00:43:58.960 --> 00:44:00.760
wanted to have them be one of the four policemen.

00:44:00.800 --> 00:44:03.159
So we had to have Chiang Kai -shek seen as like

00:44:03.159 --> 00:44:05.719
Churchill. Well, I would argue that... As a political

00:44:05.719 --> 00:44:08.519
matter. That people did portray the government,

00:44:08.679 --> 00:44:12.579
the nationalist government, as being in charge

00:44:12.579 --> 00:44:18.380
when it's just, it controls, it is one of a group.

00:44:19.019 --> 00:44:22.559
of a series of contending forces within China.

00:44:22.599 --> 00:44:24.579
It really only controlled, directly controlled,

00:44:24.619 --> 00:44:28.079
about a quarter of China. Yeah. Throughout its

00:44:28.079 --> 00:44:30.760
entire, because you've got warlords, you have

00:44:30.760 --> 00:44:35.599
communists. So, Shang never, ever consolidates

00:44:35.599 --> 00:44:39.360
power and is able to rule and initiate all these

00:44:39.360 --> 00:44:41.920
reforms that he keeps saying he's going to do

00:44:41.920 --> 00:44:45.639
someday when it's convenient. And this is for...

00:44:46.269 --> 00:44:50.210
say, U .S. correspondents and others. But was

00:44:50.210 --> 00:44:52.710
he really going to carry out those reforms? Or

00:44:52.710 --> 00:44:55.809
was he just saying that to play us? I think that

00:44:55.809 --> 00:44:59.070
there were certain reforms that they did want

00:44:59.070 --> 00:45:03.349
to enact. And they were constantly coming up

00:45:03.349 --> 00:45:06.050
with slogans for this. But in terms of turning

00:45:06.050 --> 00:45:10.429
China into a democracy, hell no. That's not going

00:45:10.429 --> 00:45:15.400
to happen. If Chang's, you know, Sun Yat -sen

00:45:15.400 --> 00:45:17.880
may have liked people like Washington and Lincoln,

00:45:18.119 --> 00:45:23.679
Chang idealized Hitler and the Nazis. In fact,

00:45:23.739 --> 00:45:26.139
Stilwell just basically thought that, you know,

00:45:26.139 --> 00:45:28.480
he was constantly griping in his diary about

00:45:28.480 --> 00:45:33.079
how Chang was just a Chinese version of Hitler.

00:45:33.139 --> 00:45:37.119
And why are we fighting alongside this creep

00:45:37.119 --> 00:45:54.000
here? The bottom line for me is, uh, Chung Kai

00:45:54.000 --> 00:45:57.820
-shek was playing us, but he was playing us for

00:45:57.820 --> 00:46:00.119
reasons that make sense from his perspective.

00:46:00.980 --> 00:46:03.940
And in a way, maybe we shouldn't have expected

00:46:03.940 --> 00:46:06.599
anything else. And we should have handled him

00:46:06.599 --> 00:46:10.920
in that way. And, and, and, and in a way, maybe

00:46:10.920 --> 00:46:13.179
all these arguments about Stilwell versus Chenault

00:46:13.179 --> 00:46:16.179
or, you know, quid pro quo versus being nicer

00:46:16.179 --> 00:46:19.369
to, easier on Chung Kai -shek. Should we have

00:46:19.369 --> 00:46:21.030
reformed the Chinese army or not? And all these

00:46:21.030 --> 00:46:23.090
kind of things. Maybe they missed just the broader

00:46:23.090 --> 00:46:26.590
point that Chong was going to play us no matter

00:46:26.590 --> 00:46:29.170
what, that it makes sense for him to do that,

00:46:29.230 --> 00:46:31.949
and that we went in with all these ideas that

00:46:31.949 --> 00:46:34.030
were completely false about what the China was

00:46:34.030 --> 00:46:36.230
that we were really dealing with. And I would

00:46:36.230 --> 00:46:40.409
argue that this is a mistake. We did not learn

00:46:40.409 --> 00:46:43.690
the lesson that we should have learned, and that

00:46:43.690 --> 00:46:47.090
is that local politicians are going to try to

00:46:47.090 --> 00:46:52.469
tell us, what we want to hear. And we keep seeing

00:46:52.469 --> 00:46:56.630
this happen over and over and over again. I mean,

00:46:56.670 --> 00:47:00.650
down, I mean, if we want to just take, look at

00:47:00.650 --> 00:47:04.710
this, look at what's happening in China and think

00:47:04.710 --> 00:47:07.289
about, you know, the lead up to the war with

00:47:07.289 --> 00:47:11.360
Iraq. and how we were basically going to have

00:47:11.360 --> 00:47:14.039
a democratic Iraq, and we were going to have

00:47:14.039 --> 00:47:16.039
all of these wonderful things that we're going

00:47:16.039 --> 00:47:18.860
to develop. And be seen as liberators. And be

00:47:18.860 --> 00:47:21.920
seen as liberators. I remember that one. And

00:47:21.920 --> 00:47:25.829
yes, and it's kind of like, you know. Always

00:47:25.829 --> 00:47:28.210
be suspicious, I would say, to anybody who's

00:47:28.210 --> 00:47:29.849
listening to this. Always be suspicious whenever

00:47:29.849 --> 00:47:32.750
somebody comes up with that kind of rationale.

00:47:33.550 --> 00:47:36.030
Also, that wars will pay for themselves. That's

00:47:36.030 --> 00:47:39.170
another load of bullshit that people like to

00:47:39.170 --> 00:47:42.829
put out there. One thing I would like to also

00:47:42.829 --> 00:47:47.750
talk about, because this is something that we

00:47:47.750 --> 00:47:51.010
see with people who tended to look favorably

00:47:51.010 --> 00:47:54.619
upon the communists. And Chiang Kai -shek, even

00:47:54.619 --> 00:47:57.420
though Chiang Kai -shek, you know, has this sort

00:47:57.420 --> 00:48:02.019
of like idealization of Hitler, making him kind

00:48:02.019 --> 00:48:06.000
of almost a bad guy here, as far as history goes,

00:48:06.260 --> 00:48:11.179
Chiang's body count, even though he's in power

00:48:11.179 --> 00:48:15.559
for like about something like 22 years, 1927

00:48:15.559 --> 00:48:20.179
to 49, his body counts around 20 million, which

00:48:20.179 --> 00:48:23.309
is huge. But then let's look at what the communists

00:48:23.309 --> 00:48:29.610
managed to accomplish. Mao is probably the dictator

00:48:29.610 --> 00:48:31.989
who has the most blood on his hands in human

00:48:31.989 --> 00:48:35.389
history. Eighty million people die. Now, this

00:48:35.389 --> 00:48:37.269
is off in the future. This is off in the future.

00:48:37.389 --> 00:48:39.409
During World War II, no. This is beyond World

00:48:39.409 --> 00:48:41.789
War II. This is during when the communists are

00:48:41.789 --> 00:48:44.829
running government. So the reason I'm putting

00:48:44.829 --> 00:48:47.869
this out there is if we're going to look at...

00:48:48.490 --> 00:48:51.070
You know, there is this sense that somehow the

00:48:51.070 --> 00:48:52.909
communists are agrarian reformers and they're

00:48:52.909 --> 00:48:56.889
somehow more moral than Chiang Kai -shek's government.

00:48:57.530 --> 00:49:00.210
You know, is this really the case? Does history

00:49:00.210 --> 00:49:04.949
support this when they get into power? No. I

00:49:04.949 --> 00:49:07.010
mean, some of this is due to incompetency, but

00:49:07.010 --> 00:49:11.110
others are due to just Mao's general bloody -mindedness.

00:49:11.730 --> 00:49:16.519
So the idea that... somehow or the other perceiving

00:49:16.519 --> 00:49:19.519
Chiang to be the bad guy and the communists to

00:49:19.519 --> 00:49:22.420
be somehow on the side of the angels because

00:49:22.420 --> 00:49:24.860
they want to take on the Japanese, when they

00:49:24.860 --> 00:49:29.179
actually do exercise power, they are far crueler

00:49:29.179 --> 00:49:32.260
than anything Chiang Kai -shek came up with.

00:49:32.539 --> 00:49:35.480
There are famines that happened during Chiang's

00:49:35.480 --> 00:49:39.119
time, but there are man -made famines that happened

00:49:39.119 --> 00:49:43.219
under Mao's... regime there. Yeah, well, how

00:49:43.219 --> 00:49:44.619
many people died in the Cultural Revolution?

00:49:44.760 --> 00:49:47.199
Yeah. Later on, I mean, how many? Or the Great

00:49:47.199 --> 00:49:53.019
Leap Forward, where basically China de -industrializes.

00:49:53.659 --> 00:49:57.900
So going into these things, looking for good

00:49:57.900 --> 00:50:00.159
guys, looking for guys with white hats who are

00:50:00.159 --> 00:50:02.179
going to, like, come in and fulfill some sort

00:50:02.179 --> 00:50:05.380
of vision for the future of the U .S., that is

00:50:05.380 --> 00:50:07.480
a problem that we keep doing again and again

00:50:07.480 --> 00:50:11.510
and again. And I think that this is you're looking

00:50:11.510 --> 00:50:14.550
for something that really isn't there. And we

00:50:14.550 --> 00:50:18.889
see it happening over and over. OK, I'm going

00:50:18.889 --> 00:50:21.610
to zoom back out just slightly. And you all may

00:50:21.610 --> 00:50:24.250
have covered some of this, but I don't have a

00:50:24.250 --> 00:50:28.110
great 360 degree view of the inner workings,

00:50:28.110 --> 00:50:30.989
the conflicts between the communists and Chiang

00:50:30.989 --> 00:50:33.670
Kai -shek's government that went on for decades,

00:50:33.869 --> 00:50:37.539
it sounds like. Well. Originally, during the

00:50:37.539 --> 00:50:41.579
20s, as Chiang is attempting to rise up in the

00:50:41.579 --> 00:50:44.719
world and take over the leadership position for

00:50:44.719 --> 00:50:48.019
his old mentor, Sun Yat -sen, he was actually

00:50:48.019 --> 00:50:50.699
working with the communists. The communists were

00:50:50.699 --> 00:50:55.239
part of his group that was trying to sort of

00:50:55.239 --> 00:50:59.099
bring everybody under his government and his

00:50:59.099 --> 00:51:04.929
rule. You have at the military academy that kind

00:51:04.929 --> 00:51:08.530
of like Chiang used to turn out the Waipoa Academy

00:51:08.530 --> 00:51:12.510
that was actually helped out by the Comintern,

00:51:12.650 --> 00:51:17.230
by the Russians, sending Russian experts down

00:51:17.230 --> 00:51:20.809
to teach. Chiang has as his political officer

00:51:20.809 --> 00:51:25.389
there Zhou Enlai. And Zhou Enlai becomes the

00:51:25.389 --> 00:51:29.320
number two person. under Mao and he's considered

00:51:29.320 --> 00:51:33.199
the public face that everyone wants to deal with.

00:51:33.239 --> 00:51:34.960
He's foreign minister, he deals with Kissinger

00:51:34.960 --> 00:51:40.860
during the whole attempts to bring Nixon over

00:51:40.860 --> 00:51:44.079
there for Nixon's visit to China and normalization

00:51:44.079 --> 00:51:50.760
of relations. So at one point Chiang Kai -shek

00:51:50.760 --> 00:51:55.000
and the Kuomintang or the Nationalist Party They

00:51:55.000 --> 00:51:56.980
are working hand in glove with the communists.

00:51:58.800 --> 00:52:06.920
Then, in 1927, in Shanghai, because Chiang starts

00:52:06.920 --> 00:52:09.360
getting all sorts of support for people who are

00:52:09.360 --> 00:52:14.440
most definitely not communists, bankers, industrialists,

00:52:14.460 --> 00:52:18.300
etc., Chiang breaks with the communists in a

00:52:18.300 --> 00:52:23.239
real bloody -minded way and massacres. and decimates

00:52:23.239 --> 00:52:27.900
the entire urban population of the Chinese Communist

00:52:27.900 --> 00:52:32.619
Party. He goes after them, and in the book by

00:52:32.619 --> 00:52:35.739
Andre Malraux that deals with this particular

00:52:35.739 --> 00:52:39.610
episode in Chinese history, Man's Fate, Chiang

00:52:39.610 --> 00:52:41.769
is going around and he's rounding people up.

00:52:41.789 --> 00:52:43.949
He's throwing them into incinerators and killing

00:52:43.949 --> 00:52:47.170
them. He's not even shooting them. He's burning

00:52:47.170 --> 00:52:50.530
them to death. So it's a pretty cruel and bloody

00:52:50.530 --> 00:52:53.730
-minded way of going about breaking with the

00:52:53.730 --> 00:52:55.510
Chinese communists. And what prompted him to

00:52:55.510 --> 00:52:57.710
start doing this exactly? What was the thing

00:52:57.710 --> 00:52:59.210
that caused him to do this right at that time?

00:52:59.250 --> 00:53:03.010
He is starting to get support from leading capitalist

00:53:03.010 --> 00:53:06.719
forces. who are fearful of... No, I understand

00:53:06.719 --> 00:53:09.079
that, but what I'm asking is why right then in

00:53:09.079 --> 00:53:12.239
1927? What triggered him to do this? He was all

00:53:12.239 --> 00:53:15.900
of a sudden getting money from them, and in exchange,

00:53:16.019 --> 00:53:17.820
they wanted him to break with the communists.

00:53:18.579 --> 00:53:19.840
Well, did they say, could you please kill all

00:53:19.840 --> 00:53:21.480
of them? Yes. Or was that his idea? That was

00:53:21.480 --> 00:53:24.400
sort of a string that was attached to the sport.

00:53:24.539 --> 00:53:26.820
Okay, gotcha. You know, there's foreigners that

00:53:26.820 --> 00:53:29.760
are involved as well. There is a great deal of

00:53:29.760 --> 00:53:33.929
distrust by people of... the affluent classes

00:53:33.929 --> 00:53:37.389
towards some of the goals of the Chinese communist.

00:53:38.070 --> 00:53:42.130
And so they said, hey, if you want support from

00:53:42.130 --> 00:53:45.650
us, and Chang was kind of running things on a

00:53:45.650 --> 00:53:49.230
shoestring there, if you want support from us,

00:53:49.269 --> 00:53:51.170
you're going to have to, like, break with them.

00:53:51.289 --> 00:53:55.710
And he had no problem with this. But this is

00:53:55.710 --> 00:53:59.829
why a lot of the leading forces, a lot of leading

00:53:59.829 --> 00:54:05.000
members, the Chinese communists, were from the

00:54:05.000 --> 00:54:07.599
rural part where we're talking the peasants.

00:54:07.940 --> 00:54:10.920
This is where Mao was from. Mao was not part

00:54:10.920 --> 00:54:14.199
of this sort of like urban communist elite. That

00:54:14.199 --> 00:54:18.480
was basically rounded up and rolled up in the

00:54:18.480 --> 00:54:22.579
period of 1927. This left a lot of bad blood,

00:54:22.639 --> 00:54:26.960
as you might expect, between Chiang's nationalists

00:54:26.960 --> 00:54:32.519
and also the communists. They retreated to the

00:54:32.519 --> 00:54:36.420
countryside. They kind of broke off. You would

00:54:36.420 --> 00:54:38.400
have people from the urban environment kind of

00:54:38.400 --> 00:54:41.119
like leaving that environment and going off to

00:54:41.119 --> 00:54:44.400
the countryside, which is where the Chinese communists

00:54:44.400 --> 00:54:52.139
chose to operate. So after 27, there was no cooperation,

00:54:52.420 --> 00:54:57.099
really, and a lot of suspicion. because of the

00:54:57.099 --> 00:55:00.139
choices that Chiang had made during that period.

00:55:00.179 --> 00:55:02.019
There were occasional initiatives where they

00:55:02.019 --> 00:55:04.320
would shake hands or toast each other. Popular

00:55:04.320 --> 00:55:06.980
front stuff. Popular front stuff. When the Japanese

00:55:06.980 --> 00:55:10.280
invaded, you know, you're being attacked by the

00:55:10.280 --> 00:55:13.179
Japanese. There was an idea of, you know, we're

00:55:13.179 --> 00:55:15.659
allied as a united front against the Japanese.

00:55:16.340 --> 00:55:20.739
But that was more in name only because that didn't...

00:55:21.469 --> 00:55:23.530
create some kind of big national feeling of,

00:55:23.530 --> 00:55:24.730
you know, we're all on the same side together

00:55:24.730 --> 00:55:26.829
by any stretch. It was like, okay, the Japanese

00:55:26.829 --> 00:55:29.289
are here and we're still having our fight with

00:55:29.289 --> 00:55:30.610
each other, but we have to maintain our power

00:55:30.610 --> 00:55:32.710
base, you know, for after the Japanese are gone.

00:55:32.809 --> 00:55:34.429
A lot of it was motivated by things like that,

00:55:34.469 --> 00:55:39.010
not by true cooperation, you know, against the

00:55:39.010 --> 00:55:40.690
Japanese. Or a national idea of China. I was

00:55:40.690 --> 00:55:42.170
just going to say, it doesn't sound like they

00:55:42.170 --> 00:55:46.210
had a terrible, great idea of nationalism as

00:55:46.210 --> 00:55:49.769
a complete... country i mean there was kind of

00:55:49.769 --> 00:55:52.969
like you know there there was a vision that shang

00:55:52.969 --> 00:55:56.170
yeah i i think i had but i think the nationalists

00:55:56.170 --> 00:55:59.210
and the communists both wanted to unite all of

00:55:59.210 --> 00:56:01.690
china yeah i mean i think they wanted to do that

00:56:01.690 --> 00:56:04.369
so in the sense of uh of their of their having

00:56:04.369 --> 00:56:08.570
a uh a nationalism a blood and soil nationalism

00:56:08.570 --> 00:56:11.590
right this should be china we should one government

00:56:11.590 --> 00:56:14.030
should control all of it right i think they both

00:56:14.030 --> 00:56:16.889
shared that They disagree on which one of them

00:56:16.889 --> 00:56:22.730
it should be. But was it, you know, were they

00:56:22.730 --> 00:56:26.809
willing to make sacrifices with regard to the

00:56:26.809 --> 00:56:29.289
other in order to achieve that goal? And the

00:56:29.289 --> 00:56:33.429
answer is no. You know, they would rather fight

00:56:33.429 --> 00:56:35.110
each other than fight even somebody like the

00:56:35.110 --> 00:56:36.590
Japanese coming and taking over half the country.

00:56:36.590 --> 00:56:38.690
Well, there's a lot of bad blood here. There's

00:56:38.690 --> 00:56:41.269
a whole history of bad blood. There are occasions

00:56:41.269 --> 00:56:45.210
during the 30s. the events that preceded Mao's

00:56:45.210 --> 00:56:51.130
Long March, where the Chinese communists are

00:56:51.130 --> 00:56:54.869
nearly exterminated by Chiang Kai -shek. So it's

00:56:54.869 --> 00:56:56.750
not like he was totally incompetent with dealing

00:56:56.750 --> 00:57:04.429
with that particular adversary. He had done enough

00:57:04.429 --> 00:57:07.389
to kind of prevent, you know, the kind of things

00:57:07.389 --> 00:57:09.570
that, say, Stilwell and some of the China hands

00:57:09.570 --> 00:57:14.260
were advocating. are kind of silly. It would

00:57:14.260 --> 00:57:18.800
be kind of like, in our own case, during the

00:57:18.800 --> 00:57:21.900
American Revolution, if, say, somebody like the

00:57:21.900 --> 00:57:24.280
Marquis de Lafayette came up to Washington and

00:57:24.280 --> 00:57:26.139
said, you know, these Tories, they're not so

00:57:26.139 --> 00:57:29.119
bad. You ought to form like a common government

00:57:29.119 --> 00:57:31.380
with them and a united front against the British

00:57:31.380 --> 00:57:34.800
with the Tories and bring them into your government

00:57:34.800 --> 00:57:37.059
and bring them into your military. And Washington

00:57:37.059 --> 00:57:42.519
would have, you know, had a fit over that. There

00:57:42.519 --> 00:57:45.880
is too much hostility between the two sides here

00:57:45.880 --> 00:57:48.980
to think for one moment that they could cooperate

00:57:48.980 --> 00:57:52.179
in a sort of national government after the Japanese

00:57:52.179 --> 00:57:53.820
leave. But see, that goes back to what we were

00:57:53.820 --> 00:57:55.780
talking about, which is this fundamental misunderstanding.

00:57:56.119 --> 00:57:59.840
Yes. The idea that the issue here is for China

00:57:59.840 --> 00:58:02.940
to defeat the Japanese. Yes. That's the thing.

00:58:03.199 --> 00:58:05.960
All of China working together to defeat the Japanese.

00:58:06.179 --> 00:58:08.760
And that was not what either side had as its

00:58:08.760 --> 00:58:12.030
goal. Not at all. Ultimately, I mean, they wanted

00:58:12.030 --> 00:58:14.010
someone else to defeat the Japanese so then they

00:58:14.010 --> 00:58:15.710
could fight each other and so that one of them

00:58:15.710 --> 00:58:17.750
could take over China. That's very different

00:58:17.750 --> 00:58:20.630
from saying, you know what, let's bury the hatchet.

00:58:20.630 --> 00:58:22.789
Let's get the Japanese out of here. And then

00:58:22.789 --> 00:58:25.389
we'll have, you know, established bonds of camaraderie.

00:58:25.389 --> 00:58:27.170
And, you know, we're all Chinese here together.

00:58:27.869 --> 00:58:30.429
And then let's form a government together. And

00:58:30.429 --> 00:58:31.670
some of us will be communists, some of us will

00:58:31.670 --> 00:58:33.150
be nationalists, and we'll have a parliament

00:58:33.150 --> 00:58:35.530
and we'll vote, you know. That wasn't their goal.

00:58:35.920 --> 00:58:37.480
That's in a very American way of thinking about

00:58:37.480 --> 00:58:39.579
things, I guess. That was not the goal of either

00:58:39.579 --> 00:58:41.679
side. Think about the British at this point.

00:58:41.800 --> 00:58:44.460
All right, so you have Churchill, who's Tory,

00:58:44.739 --> 00:58:47.980
but you also have various members of the Labour

00:58:47.980 --> 00:58:53.139
Party involved in the government. And that's

00:58:53.139 --> 00:58:54.960
kind of how we're thinking this could kind of

00:58:54.960 --> 00:58:58.679
shake out here. But things are not going to work

00:58:58.679 --> 00:59:02.530
that way. You do not have that. veneer of civilization

00:59:02.530 --> 00:59:06.829
that is going to make sure and ensure that everybody

00:59:06.829 --> 00:59:09.610
plays by Marquis of Coonsbury rules here. Yeah,

00:59:09.670 --> 00:59:12.590
the Chinese Communist Party is not labor, not

00:59:12.590 --> 00:59:14.550
the Labor Party. No, they're not. And the Nationalist

00:59:14.550 --> 00:59:16.590
Party is not the British Conservatives, the Tories.

00:59:16.889 --> 00:59:20.090
They're not that. They're actually more extreme

00:59:20.090 --> 00:59:23.510
versions of both. Maybe more, yeah. In a sort

00:59:23.510 --> 00:59:26.150
of right -left. Very extreme, yeah. You don't

00:59:26.150 --> 00:59:29.019
really have a middle ground here. You know, and

00:59:29.019 --> 00:59:31.219
that's kind of, you know, if you're going to

00:59:31.219 --> 00:59:35.519
like look for something to indicate democracy

00:59:35.519 --> 00:59:38.980
as possible, you can't really create a couple

00:59:38.980 --> 00:59:42.559
together democracy when everybody's taking these

00:59:42.559 --> 00:59:45.320
extreme positions here. The end of World War

00:59:45.320 --> 00:59:47.820
II did not bring about an end to conflict in

00:59:47.820 --> 00:59:50.679
China. Instead, it brought about a resumption

00:59:50.679 --> 00:59:53.079
of the Chinese Civil War and indeed the decisive

00:59:53.079 --> 00:59:56.579
phase of that war. This opened new opportunities

00:59:56.579 --> 00:59:59.039
and challenges for U .S. engagement in China,

00:59:59.119 --> 01:00:02.820
and also for new misunderstandings. We will get

01:00:02.820 --> 01:00:07.619
into all of that in the next episode. That's

01:00:07.619 --> 01:00:10.599
it for this episode of the United States of Amnesia.

01:00:10.860 --> 01:00:13.300
Thank you for listening. We hope you learned

01:00:13.300 --> 01:00:15.519
something, and we hope you discovered new ways

01:00:15.519 --> 01:00:17.980
of looking at things you had already heard or

01:00:17.980 --> 01:00:20.659
thought about, or perhaps hadn't heard about.

01:00:21.260 --> 01:00:23.739
If you enjoyed it, that's great. If we made you

01:00:23.739 --> 01:00:27.380
mad, that's okay too. Either way, email us at

01:00:27.380 --> 01:00:31.440
usa .amnesia at gmail .com and let us know what

01:00:31.440 --> 01:00:34.059
you think. Also, let us know about anything you

01:00:34.059 --> 01:00:36.320
think we missed or got wrong. We'd like to know

01:00:36.320 --> 01:00:39.599
about that too. And of course, please like and

01:00:39.599 --> 01:00:41.480
subscribe and let your friends and neighbors

01:00:41.480 --> 01:00:44.969
know about us. We also have a website. It's www

01:00:44.969 --> 01:00:51.730
.usofamnesia .com. For Marshall, Mike, and myself,

01:00:52.070 --> 01:00:54.050
Blake Hinckley. Till next time.